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1. Preface 
This thesis is a part of the Master program at The Norwegian School of Economics and Business 
Administration (NHH). Its purpose being to use to use the knowledge gained and the methods 
learned at the Master level. My goal is to make this thesis understandable for academics and 
finance professionals with the same prerequisites as myself. I believe a key course to follow the 
content easily is Risk Management at NHH, or equivalent. I also hope that this thesis will be of 
help for them who read it when it comes to take capital structure and financing decisions.  
I also want to thank Kristian Miltersen, now a professor at Handelshøyskolen i København, for 
helping and guiding me with the framework and the models used here. His advices have been 
useful for accomplishing the empirical testing.  
A thank you to Robert Goldstein, Nengjiu Ju and Hayne Leland too, for being helpful and 
contribute with explanations to their numerical examples in their article.  
And finally, but most of all, I would like to thank Jøril Mæland! She became my supervisor for 
this thesis at the most critical point, and has provided useful feedback and guidance for the 
work presented here. Her quick response and availability is deeply appreciated.  
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Abstract 
There are several issues with adapting dynamic structured credit models to be applicable for 
values observable in reality. To use the theories, and with that the models developed, to find 
optimal capital structures is challenging in many ways. No conclusion can be drawn from this 
thesis whether it is the theories that are imperfect, or companies not optimally financed. Some 
of the companies refinanced in a manner which could be in line with the dynamic optimal, while 
others lacked such indications. To find the optimal leverage ratio, by testing for the amount of 
debt optimal to issue in a restructuring, failed with respect to what is realistic. Possible 
weaknesses with existing models could be that they do not allow for the high volatility in EBIT 
which could be observed empirically. Work is still to be made, to use structured credit models as 
a decision tool for capital structure decisions. But the theories behind them could be of help to 
the people making the financing decisions.  
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3. Introduction 
I have chosen to examine whether companies are making choices to hold an optimal level of 
debt to maximize their stakeholders’ wealth, by empirically test them with a dynamic structured 
credit model. Further would I like to find the amount of debt the model suggests, if I would use 
a structured credit model as a tool in a financing decision. Another interesting observation 
would be if the debt level suggested by the model would be realistic, and in line with debt and 
interest ratios observed empirically.  
To really understand what affects the value of debt, equity and other claims to a company’s 
cash flow, fundamentals of prevailing capital structure views, and what separates them from 
former theories is important. I would therefore look into some capital structure history, as the 
model and tests here could be mistaken for the traditional capital structure view. 
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4. Some capital-structure history.   
There have been several ways of considering choices of capital-structures through time. Before 
Modigliani and Miller (Miller and Modigliani, 1958) described their theory in 1958, the 
prevailing view was the existence of an optimal mix of debt and equity that maximized the total 
value of a firm, the Traditionalists (Brealey, Myers  and Allen, 2008 ). This view was also under the 
assumption of perfect capital markets. This being the case, the Return on Assets (ROA) of a 
company would have a minimum and the value a maximum at a certain rate of debt. Their 
argument was that by changing the way a company was financed, the return on the same assets 
would be different, and at a certain mix optimal.  The basis of the assumptions was the belief 
that debt remained more or less risk-less by low ratios, and so did the equity. By higher debt-
ratios the risk of both debt and equity increased. I want to emphasize the traditional view 
prevailing before Modigliani and Miller (MM) as well, since this thesis will try to find exactly 
what the traditionalists claimed, videlicet the existence of an optimal capital structure. But in 
contrast to the traditional view, my approach is based on MM’s findings.  
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Figure 1 – (Brealey, Myers  and Allen, 2008 )Shows the view of Miller and Modigliani in contrast to the traditional opinion 
with return under different leverage ratios.  The red line shows the return on assets under the traditional view. The 
traditionalists believed borrowing increased the return on equity at a lower ratio in the beginning, compared to MM, but 
increased rapidly from a certain leverage ratio. This resulted in the smiling return on assets line. This had a minimum point 
where the value of the company would have a maximum (lowest discount rate on the company’s total cash flow). In contrast 
MM believed the return on equity increased proportionally with the leverage ratio in the beginning, but at a certain point 
(because of equities limited liability) the increased return on debt exactly offset the increase in equity return. Hence, the 
return on assets was constant with MM’s theory, and so was the total value of the company (debt plus equity).  
The traditionalistic view is in contrast to MM’s findings. MM said the total value of a company 
was unaffected by how it was financed. They assumed perfect capital markets, zero taxes and 
zero bankruptcy-costs. I will further explain how the same applies even though taxes, 
bankruptcy-costs and restructuring-costs are present. I will stress that it is the total-value which 
is unaffected. Taxes and bankruptcy-costs do affect value of equity and debt.  
The novelty of MM’s findings was that they claimed the total value was independent of the 
capital structure. The value of a firm is the present value of all its future cash-flows, discounted 
at a risk-adjusted rate. This value has to be the same no matter how the assets are financed. 
The assets are the same, and so is the potential output.  
Consider an all equity firm in a zero tax world. The value of that company would be the total 
present value of all future cash-flows. By adding debt to the company, some of the cash-flows 
would be streamed to the creditors rather than equity-holders. It would be the same cash-flow, 
generated by the same assets, but now the creditors have a claim to a part of it. If slicing an 
identical cash-flow into different streams would add to the total value, would mean managers 
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optimizing capital-structures was alchemists. In other words must the value come from 
somewhere.  
The “somewhere” is consistent with MM’s findings. As long as there is an MM-world, the value 
of equity will be exactly offset by the amount of debt added, and handed out as dividend. The 
extra value that could be observed virtually comes from the tax-shield effect of debt. In Norway 
the effective tax-rate on equity is 48.16%, and 28% on debt (OECD). For equity its 28% tax on 
the pre-tax earnings to the company, and when paid out as dividend there is 28% tax too, or 
stocks are sold with profit, reflecting the earnings. Since the tax is a profit tax, interests are tax 
deductable. By taking on debt, and pay it out to equity-holders, investors get a shield towards 
taxes, by the amount of the tax-spread between interests and capital taxation. The value added 
to equity is from the part of future cash-flow claims previously held by the government. By 
taking on debt and hand it out to equity-holders, some of the value are taken from the 
government and given to equity-holders. If EBIT=Interests, the total taxes paid from a 
company’s operations would be 28%, the tax on interests. This is consistent with MM’s findings. 
Values are neither created nor lost by mixing the financing between equity and debt. The values 
are only transferred between different claimants. 
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 This takes us further to the existence of bankruptcy-costs. If there weren’t any costs connected 
to bankruptcy, the optimal level of debt would be as much as the companies’ cash-flow allowed. 
In Norway the direct costs of bankruptcy is 1% of the estate and 7% in the US (World Bank, 
Doing Business). The average recovery-rate on claims to the estate is 89% and 76.7% 
respectively. In other words, there is risk in debt and a loss of value connected to a bankruptcy 
for the pre-default claimants. By adding debt the risk of default increases. When a company 
levers up, it also puts on liabilities it has to service. The interest-rate to be paid on debt is 
therefore an increasing function of the debt-rate and the loss in the event of default. A real-
estate company would cause less harm to creditors than a firm with strictly intangible assets. 
The risk of equity therefore starts to increase by adding debt. By a certain debt-ratio the debt 
also starts to take on some risk. This risk is a transfer from the equity, which by this ratio have a 
1
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Taxes
3
Equity
Debt
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costs
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Figure 2: Shows the distributions of the same firm, under the four different market 
assumptions. 1 – The zero-tax zero bankruptcy costs. 2 – With taxes, but zero 
bankruptcy-costs. 3 – With default costs, but zero tax.  4 – With both taxes and 
default-costs. The total present value of the firm is the same but the distribution of 
the company’s value among its claimants is different. This is for illustration purpose 
only, and not from any real example later in this thesis. In 1 the capital-structure is 
irrelevant. In 2 the optimal would be to have debt only, or as much debt as possible. 
In 3 all equity, or very low debt ratios would be preferred. In 4 there is a trade-off 
between taxes and increased interests, as distress-costs increase.  
 
10 
 
declining rate of increase in risk and return. By this debt-level the risk of bankruptcy starts 
affecting the debt since equity-holders have limited liability. Hence, this risk doesn’t add strictly 
to the equity. In this framework the ROA is constant at all debt ratios, in contrast to the 
Traditionalists, and the total value of the firm is, given all other factors, constant for all debt-
levels.  
The required fundamentals to understand the trade-off theory should now be explained. The 
optimal ratio of debt is that which maximizes the existing equity-holders value. This is a tradeoff 
between the increased cost of debt and the gain obtained by the tax-shield. A certain leverage-
ratio would maximize the existing equity-holders wealth. A company with strictly debt and 
equity financing would have five claimants. The government through taxes, equity and debt 
holders, bankruptcy claimants and the claimants of restructuring costs involved in changing the 
capital-structure. The sum of all these claims adds up to the total value of the company. At 
every restructuring point, it takes place a transfer of claims. The cash-flow is the same, and so is 
the present total value. Only the composition of the claims is changed.  
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5. Capital Structure Models 
The pioneers in capital structure model theories were Kane, Marcus and McDonald, who 
introduced their theories already in 1982 and 1985 (Goldstein, Leland and Ju, 2001). These 
theories were further developed by Fisher, Heinkel and Zechner in 1989 (Goldstein, Leland and Ju, 
2001). Their theories and models focused strictly on corporate finance theories which could 
explain managements’ capital structure choices, but lacked the focus on credit risk and costs 
related to bankruptcy and restructuring. These links were picked up in Leland’s article (Leland, 
1994) from 1994, and connected.  
A thorough problem with the early models was the lack of a consistent use of parameter 
variables, which was missing. The values of interest, hence those which the model was trying to 
solve or figure out, were derived from the properties of an unlevered firm value. With this 
approach the models tested for optimal debt ratios, credit spreads et cetera by first un-levering 
the characteristics of a company, and then optimized matters relating debt side by side with the 
unlevered firm. In other words did they allow the existence of two conditions that in reality 
could not exist simultaneously.  
It may also be questioned if the state of the properties of an unlevered firm actually can exist. 
Even corporations without debt have the option to issue debt in the future, and historical prices 
could account for this potential. Goldstein et al (2001) uses Microsoft as an example of an un-
levered firm, which had guided that it would not put on any debt in the future. The company is 
also of the size that a buy-out or the purchase of a controlling majority for the purpose of 
instructing management seems unlikely. They argue that such companies may be priced as 
unlevered companies. As recent as May 11
th
 2009 Microsoft announced that they had filed for a 
substantial debt-issue (Techflash, 2009) (6 billion USD).  This strengthens the argument from 
Ammann and Genser’s paper from 2004
 
(Ammana and Genser, 2004). They conclude that 
dynamic capital structure models of unlevered corporations cannot be used for model-testing.  
This brings us to the model this thesis will be based on. By using EBIT as the state variable, the 
issues of leverage and financing vanish. EBIT (Earnings Before Interests and Tax) is a variable 
independent of a company’s financing decisions, and also exist simultaneously no matter how a 
12 
 
company has mixed its debt and equity. In other words it consists of all the cash-flows that are 
transferred to the company’s different stakeholders.  
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6. The Structured Credit Models 
As mentioned, Leland made a link between the established corporate capital models and the 
structured credit models in his paper “Debt Value, Bond Covenants, and Optimal Capital 
Structure” from 1994. This was not a total new way of thinking, but Leland structured the 
theories in a new uniform framework.  
As a basis, the models have EBIT as its state variable. Assume that over time depreciation and 
amortization are equivalent with required capital expenditures to stay in business, which is a 
reasonable assumption. Over time EBIT is therefore the income unit financing the company’s 
claimants.  
Further, the total value of the company is the present value of all future EBITs. To put this in a 
framework, Leland assumed that EBIT was following a standard Brownian motion (he does not 
specify whether it is geometric or arithmetic). With this the total value of the company, which is 
derived from the cash-flow, would also follow a Brownian motion. In the traditional framework 
this characteristic was applied to the unlevered value of equity.  
The optimal mix of equity and debt is the mix that maximizes the value of equity, and with that 
the value of debt and equity (claims to the cash flow is transferred from the government). Here 
Leland had a static approach. By a static approach we mean that a company can issue debt 
once, and then hold the issued nominal amount thereafter. The static approach also returns an 
optimal solution on closed form. But assuming that you cannot put on debt in the future also 
motivates for higher debt-levels today, to maximize the benefits of the tax-shield. The model 
therefore yields a higher debt-level than what is observed in reality. 
To compensate for this, the model must account for potential future debt-issues. By accounting 
for future debt, the level it needs to take on today can be reduced. Management does not need 
to overshoot the debt amount, but rather keep the debt-ratio in a certain range, and when it 
reaches a certain ratio, refinance with a greater amount of debt.  
This is the model that will be presented in this thesis. The model was presented by Goldstein, Ju 
and Leland in 2001, and is a dynamic version of Leland’s model from 94. This model does not 
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have a closed form solution, so to find the optimal ratio a computer tool is required to find the 
numerical solution.  
The target with the dynamical approach is to find a debt level which triggers restructuring of the 
debt. As long as the company is in the range between a high and a low debt ratio, management 
does not make any restructuring choices. Once a low ratio is reached (Debt to Total value), the 
company restructures by issuing new debt, and restores the initial level.  This will assure the 
company always is in an optimal debt-range, regarding maximizing its shareholders value. It 
trades off some risk of being too highly levered by holding the option to issue debt in the future, 
as well as holding the benefits of the tax-shield.  
This takes us over to the next part, the description of the model used.  
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7. The Framework of the Model 
I will start by describing the mathematics of the model used. This is a short version (or more a 
summary) of Goldstein et al’s findings from their article in 2001. Then I will explain how I have 
modeled the equations used, so they were applicable for the collected data. Some changes have 
been made, making only observable parameters needed as input.   
All values are present value of future cash claims. As described above, a company has five 
different claimants, the government, creditors, equity holders, restructuring costs to legal and 
financial advisers and bankruptcy costs.  
I will start with introducing the static model which only allow for one debt issue, and from that 
derive the dynamic model, as done by Goldstein et al. This will give a more intuitive 
understanding of how the model works, and the more complicated matters could be explained 
when they arise. 
We start with a simple model of firm dynamics, which is supported by the rational expectations 
general equilibrium framework. Imagine the payout flow of a pure exchange economy: 

 =  + 	 
where  and  are constants. It is well known that any asset can be valued by discounting its 
expected future cash flow, generated under the risk neutral measure. The value of the claim will 
be:  

 =  


=  −  
where  =  −  is the risk neutral drift. Since r and  are constants, both V and  share 
the same dynamics. 

 =  + 	  which gives  =  + 	.  
The risk neutral expected return will be the risk free rate, as for an equivalent martingale 
measure, so every claimant receives a fair expected return for the exposed risk. Further, 
Goldstein et al assume a simple tax structure, which also I have done. Assumed is a structure 
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which includes tax on effective dividends (), tax on interests ( ) and tax on corporate profits 
(!), with full loss offset provision.  
With this framework there is no such thing as an all equity firm. Even with zero debt, the 
government has a claim to the taxed revenue.  The cash flow to the company is streamed to the 
different claimants, and each stream is then valued. The sum of all claims adds up to the total 
value of the firm.  For a company with a management that does not take on any debt, the value 
is:  = "1 − $%%&
' for equity and ( = $%%
' for the government and the effective tax rate is 
given by "1 − $%%& = 1 − !1 −  for equity investors.  
If we want to maximize the equity-holders wealth by issuing debt once (the static approach), the 
interesting is the amount of debt to issue. Assume the company can service debt up to the level 
where the coupon is C, and will choose bankruptcy if the debt level reaches 
). Then we define 
the cost of a potential bankruptcy to be *
) if the company reaches 
). We now have four 
claims to the company, which each has to satisfy the following partial differential equation 
(PDE), P being the payout flow, 

+ + 
,
2 
,+ + + + . = + 
The debt is assumed perpetual, and by that the claim to the principal is independent of time. 
The rationale for the perpetual assumption is that they want to keep the nominal debt issued, 
which at the time of the issue should be optimal. Perpetual debt instruments exist, but a more 
common rationale would be that at maturity the amount is refinanced. We may therefore write: 
0 = 
+ + 
,
2 
,+ − + 
The general solution is +01 = 23
4 + 2,
5 where 6 = 378 9: − 7
8
, ; + <: − 7
8
, ;
, + 2,= 
and 
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> = 378 9: − 7
8
, ; − <: − 7
8
, ;
, + 2,= . 23 and 2, are constants, determined by boundary 
conditions. The general solution does not account for inter-temporal solutions. These must be 
derived from the particular solutions. We define ?)
 as the present value of a claim paying 1 
contingent of firm value if 
) is reached. This claim does not result in any immediate payout, 
hence the claim must be on the form ?)
 = 23
4 + 2,
5. Accounting for the boundary 
conditions: lim→ ?)
 = 0, lim→E  ?)
 = 1 we find:  
?)
 =  

)5 
When the firm is solvent, the government, debt holders and equity holders share the payout 
from the company. If all claims were held by one owner, he would be entitled to the entire 
payout, as long as the value stays above 
). This value is the solvent value of the company, and I 
will refer to it as 
FGH. Values adequately over 
) approaches the total firm value V, meaning 

FGH = 
 − 
)?)
. Each single claim can be found in the same way. The interest claim will be  

 I = J K1 − ?)
L1 
The claims to the solvent company will be (remember the debt is perpetual):  
Equity: FGH
 = "1 − $%%&
FGH − 
 I 
Government: (FGH
 = $%%
FGH − 
 I +  
 I 
Debt: MFGH
 = 1 −  
 I 
The sum of these adds up to 
FGH.  
We assume the creditors are protected by certain covenants, e.g. sale of assets and change of 
control covenants. Due to the protective covenants, none of the EBIT generating assets are 
allowed to be sold. If the payout falls below promised interest, the equity holders are entitled to 
pay in more cash. Still, at a certain point they will rather choose to default, than throw new 
                                                          
1
 Since the debt is perpetual, a claim to the principal isn’t included.  
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money after a firm that does not contribute with the required return. The equity claim will 
disappear, and the company becomes divided between the government
2
, debt holders and 
bankruptcy costs.   
The present value of the default claim can be written: 
$%
 = 
)?)
 
The sum 
$% + 
FGH  equals the total claim to EBIT, V. Hence, values are neither created nor 
lost as described introductorily. The value is only redistributed among its claimants, exactly as 
shown in the pies (figure 2). We define * as the default cost ratio.  The claims to the bankrupt 
estate are:  
Debt: M$%
 = 1 − *1 − $%%
$%
 
Government: ($% = 1 − *$%%
$%
 
Bankruptcy Costs: OJ$%
 = *
$%
 
We must also account for the cost of restructuring, which is connected to issue debt. The 
amount is deducted from the proceeds distributed to equity. This amount is a portion (given by 
a ratio) of the initial value of the debt issued, give by: PJ
' = QRMFGH
' + M$%
'S.  
To maximize the wealth of the equity holders, management must choose the coupon level C, 
and the level of where bankruptcy is preferred over continued operations, 
). 
) is found by 
invoking the smooth-pasting condition (Dixit, 1991 and Dumas, 1991).  
T
T
UE = 0 
Solving, we get: 

)∗ = W J
∗
  
where: 
                                                          
2
 Assuming that the EBIT generating machinery are sold off to a competing company, which continues to operate. 
The government will then have a claim to the cash-flow generated by the new company.  
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W ≡  66 + 1 
As mentioned, management must find the optimal coupon, J∗. If we assume the payout ratio is 
independent of C (which empirical studies oppose
3
, but theory keeps holding to), the optimal 
coupon can be obtained in closed form. Let’s define q as the restructuring cost ratio.  To 
maximize the wealth of the shareholders, management must find the solution of: 
max[ \1 − QMK
', J, 
)JL + K
', J, 
)JL^ 
This level ensures that the equity receives a fair value for their claim to the cash-flow (claim of 
the interests) sold, less the portion of cost for restructuring. By differentiating the max function 
above, with respect to C, and set the equation to zero, we find the optimal coupon to be:  
J∗ = 
' :λ; `a
1
1 + 6b a
2
2 + Obc
35
 
where: 
2 = 1 − Q1 −   − 1 − $%% 
O = λ1 − $%%K1 − 1 − Q1 − *L 
To be a tax advantage with debt, A must be greater than zero. If q=0, it will require $%% >  . If 
q>0, the effective tax rate must be sufficient to cover both taxes paid by the debt holders and 
the cost of restructuring, to be a tax-benefit.  
We now have the necessary framework to find the optimal level of debt, independent of how 
the company is currently capitalized. By putting the results from above together, we find the 
value of the equity claim just before the debt-issue to be: 
  

' = \1 − QMK
', J∗, 
)J∗L + K
', J∗, 
)J∗L^ 
= 
'R"1 − $%%& + 2eS 
                                                          
3
 Goldstein et al mention this in the article, but still argues for independence to be rational 
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where 
e ≡ `a 22 + Ob :
6
1 + 6;c
35
 
and 
' is the equation to maximize. There is a transfer of value to present equity-owners 
from the government, of which some of the values go to restructuring-costs, RC.  
The percentage increase of the equity-value is 
% ghij = 100 ∗ 2e1 − $ 
which captures the tax-advantage of debt in this static model.  
I will now go on with the framework for the dynamical model, which also is the one I have been 
using in the empirical tests. The basics are more or less the same as the static. What’s new is to 
open the model for the option of issuing further debt in the future.  
Management may decide to operate for years before taking on debt, or chooses to raise an 
optimal level of debt. In a start up phase for instance, debt might not be the preferred capital. 
But as the cash flows get more steady or necessary security to get reasonable terms on debt are 
acquired, debt instruments become more attractive.  If a company commits to optimize its debt-
level at time T, the value of the future tax-shield must still be encountered in the present value. 
As the company waits for T, an acquisition of the company from a competitor or random 
investor may occur. We assume that an acquisition will be at the optimally levered value of the 
company, which is reasonable. Most acquisitions come with a premium to the level where the 
company traded prior to the acquisition-announcement. By all means, this makes T random, 
even if the company has announced when it will lever. The present value of equity must 
therefore account for some of the potential capital structure optimizing in the future, and with 
that the tax benefit from it, even without having occurred.  
If we consider an acquisition event for absent, the value of future optimizing must still be 
accounted for. When T is adequately larger than t, the tax advantage will not be realized for a 
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long time. The value of equity will only be slightly higher than in a company that theoretically 
refuses to take on any debt at this point, ref Amman and Genser. When T approaches t, almost 
the whole tax advantage must be accounted for. Moments before the restructuring takes place 
the unlevered equity value will equal the levered one minus RC.  
In the dynamic model the company will have a threshold, 
), where it optimally chooses to 
default, as in the static case. In addition there will be a new threshold, 
k, where management 
chooses to call outstanding debt, and issue a greater amount (restructure). The ratio the larger 
amount of debt increases with, stems from a scaling feature inherent in modeling the EBIT 
claims as log-normal or proportional.  
Implications of the scaling feature is already reviewed, with 
) being proportional to J∗ and J∗ 
to 
'.  Goldstein et al illustrates this with two firms, A and B, which by all means are identical 
except their value. This gives 
') = l
'm. Because of the scaling feature, C and 
) will also differ 
by the same factor l.  The same argument as with the two firms applies to a company that 
initially issues debt, grow, and then finds it optimal to issue new debt. At this point, the time 
when its optimal to restructure, the firm will have grown with the factor l. After the new issue, 
the firm will appear as the same as at time zero, except all factors are l larger. We see 

'' = 
n' = l
''. All other claims scale up by the same factor, and period 1 starts.  
Assume debt is callable at par. For this to apply we must prove that when 
k is reached, the 
debt has the same value as when it was issued.  The bankruptcy level increases with the same 
factor l = 
n/
', the value the firm has increased with. The risk and probability of default at 
the beginning of each period will be the same as at the end of each period. The reason is that at 
the end of each period, the company will issue new debt (increased by l), so the risk level is the 
same. In other words, the old debt has the same relative coupon flow, and faces the same risk 
as at issue, hence the value must be the same.  
The dynamic model is exploiting this scaling feature.  First we find the value of all period zero 
claims. Then management must decide at which debt level it is optimal to restructure and issue 
further debt, and also increase 
) , J jh 
n with the factor l, which EBIT increases with for 
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each period. With this strategy being optimal, we find the present value of all future period 
claims by discounting them.   
We define ?k
 as the present value of a claim paying 1 if firm value reaches 
k before 
). 
This is the same principle as for 
)explained earlier. The claim will not have any dividends, 
hence it can be written:  
?k
 = 23
4 + 2,
5 
and satisfy the boundary conditions: ?k
) = 0 and ?k
k = 1. This gives: ?k
 =
− Epq∑  
4 + E
ps
∑  
5, where ∑  ≡ 
)4
k5 − 
k4
)5. We also define ?)
 for a claim 
reaching 
) before 
k.  
We are aware that: 
FGH' 
 + 
$%' 
 + 
$' 
 = 
, so EBIT is independent of the chosen 
capital structure. With full tax-offset, period zero claims after restructuring are:  
'
 = 1 −  
 I' 
 + 1 − *"1 − $%%&
$%' 
 
'
 = "1 − $%%&
FGH' 
 − 
 I' 
 
t'
 = $%% :
FGH' 
 − 
 I' 
; +  
 I' 
 + 1 − *$%%
$%' 
 
ui'
 = *
$%' 
 
The sum of these claims adds up to 
FGH' 
 + 
$%' 
 = 
 − ?k

k. Meaning the value of 
future period claims is not included. We know 
'3 = 
k' ≡ l
''. 
k and 
) scale by the same 
factor l too. Hence, it follows that: ?)3 
'3 = ?)'
'', ?k3 
'3 = ?k' 
''.  
The firm will look identical at every restructuring, since all parameters are scaled by the same 
factor. We now define e(V) as the equity claim to the intertemporal cash-flow for all future 
periods. Similarly for d(V), g(V) and bc(V). To get the total equity claim, E(V), we use an intuitive 
expansion of the claims to each period.  
$v
$vv = vvv = wvwvv = vvxvvxv =
3
3yxv. By 
multiplying with '
' we get 
' = $vv3yxv.  
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At each restructuring there will be a transfer of cash flow. The present claim to the debt is 
therefore M'
' = '
' + ?k
'M'
' = vv3xv. This value is divided between equity an 
restructuring cost at the proportion (1-q) and q. Using the scaling argument, the total claim of 
the restructuring is: PJ
' − = QM' 33yxv.  
Total claim to equity right before restructuring is the sum of the intertemporal claims of debt 
and equity less the restructuring costs.  
This chapter was a brief summary of Goldstein et al’s article, and must therefore not be red in 
another context, or perceived as being my theories (some sentences might be similar and all 
equations are the same). It is presented like this since I believe the summary is critical 
knowledge to understand the thesis and the tests done.  
The empirical tests below, has this framework as their basis. But many of the variables and 
parameters described here cannot be collected or verified. For instance cannot the total value 
of a company be verified, as the government claim is not traded or quoted. I have therefore 
made adjustments to the equations, to the extent possible, to avoid such parameters in the 
empirical test.  
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8. The framework used for the empirical testing.  
It is hard to define when companies observed last restructured, and by that define time zero. I 
will, as a consequence, focus on whether the companies observed are within the defined debt-
levels, restructuring and default boundaries. If they are, the companies must be assumed inter-
temporarily optimally levered, and in a phase between two restructurings or an event of 
default. If a company is observed with a lower debt ratio than the boundary suggests, the 
wealth of its equity owners should theoretically have a potential to increase. If a debt ratio 
higher than the upper bound would be observed, it should theoretically have defaulted. None of 
the companies which were possible to test had debt ratios suggesting default, hence the issue 
has not been further examined.  
I will explain the input parameters used for the empirical testing. It’s done with the purpose of 
identifying the upper and lower band of the optimal debt level, the 
) jh 
k as a part of the 
EBIT. Since the total value of a company is a function of its cash-flow it is actually EBIT which is 
tested. See appendix for the derivation of the used model in Wolfram Mathematica. By putting 
in 
) jh 
k, I run the test for the optimal coupon, relative to EBIT, and corresponding levels of 
changes in EBIT, which substitutes 
)and  
k. The upper and lower band is EBIT’s growth before 
a restructuring should take place (or decrease before default). For the avoidance of doubt, I do 
not actually value the whole firm with all the claims, but make the calculations with the relevant 
factors of what I analyze. EBIT is therefore the reference value for all the variables, and equal to 
1.  
The input is from Thompson Financial. I will specify the sample period for each company, since 
data were not available over the same period for all companies. The test is for an intertemporal 
period of the company, which the data samples are from. By this I check whether the companies 
have an optimal average level of debt over the period, compared to the value ex ante. The same 
applies to the restructuring level and the default level. In other words, will I try to find the 
optimal amount of debt to issue, with the average intertemporal values for each company as 
input, and the corresponding restructuring levels. As output I hope to get an upper and lower 
relative bound of EBIT, and the coupon, C, implying the debt level.  
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The framework used is based on the dynamics of Goldstein et al’s article. As input variables I use 
historical accounting numbers from the companies, gathered from Thompson.  Be aware that 
accounting principles have changed over the sample period, and that the US and Norwegian 
principles differ. The consequences of this will be discussed further below.  The inputs are the 
following equations, which is solved in Wolfram Mathematica.  
 
The function E1 is the present value of all future equity claims to EBIT, and D1 is the value of the 
debt claim to EBIT. As you see from the input, the value of equity is zero if EBIT reaches B, the 
lower boundary.  
 
If reaching the lower boundary, the default boundary, the value of the debt claim is the value of 
the company, less the restructuring costs. At the upper bound, the restructuring boundary, the 
value of the debt claim is the same as the principal.  
 
At the start of each period the equity value is the total value of the company, less the debt after 
the restructuring costs are taken out.  
 
E1 is the value of the cash stream to equity. D1 is the value of the cash stream to debt, which at 
issue is P, the principal. ξ is the EBIT from the company, te the effective tax rate for private 
investors and ti is the tax on interest. σ is the standard deviation to EBIT, r the post tax interest 
rate, q the cost of restructuring, α the cost of bankruptcy, λ the tenor of the debt which is set to 
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0 for all calculations giving infinite debt. The rationale of assuming infinite debt, is that at 
maturity the company will refinance outstanding debt unless they are bankrupt. B is the lower 
bound of EBIT where the equity should default. F is the upper bound, suggesting a restructuring 
and increase the debt, and c the coupon. All parameters are calculated with EBIT as reference, 
which is 1. A is the total value of debt and equity, stated as the relative size of EBIT. It can be 
referred to as” Value to EBIT,” a multiple similar to PE (Price/Earnings) which I will name it from 
here. µ is the implied growth rate (the drift described in previous chapter) of the company’s 
EBIT, which is tested towards A, the “PE” used in the model.  
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9. What does the data sample include, and how is it processed 
The data sample is gathered from Thompson Financial, and is each company’s annual figures. 
The collected inputs are each company’s market capitalization of equity, total interest expenses, 
EBIT and total debt. The data samples are from 1984 and including 2008, where they are 
available. To make the data available to the framework described they had to be processed. The 
standard deviation of EBIT is calculated by first finding each year’s relative change in EBIT 
 Oz{3 − Oz{'/Oz{' and then use Excel’s “stdev” function. The coupon used for input is 
calculated by taking each year’s interest expenses and divided by EBIT. Finally, the leverage ratio 
is found by dividing total debt to total debt plus the market capitalization of equity (Debt/(Debt 
+ Equity)).  
The tax rates was found at the World Bank’s web page “Doing business,” which is, according to 
them, “a Project that provides objective measures of business regulations and their enforcement 
across 183 economies and selected cities at the subnational and regional level.” Bankruptcy 
costs were collected from OECD’s web page. The interest rate used as input (the risk free) is 
Norway’s and the US’ average 10 year government bond rate over the sample period, which is 
adjusted to be post tax according to each countries taxation on interests. The rates are also 
downloaded from Thompson Financial, and for Norway the “10 year government benchmark 
yield” is used. Be aware that the US and Norway have changed their tax policy over the sample 
period, but this policy change is not reflected in the adjustments. It is the prevailing policy which 
is used.  
Most companies either did not exist in 1984 or did not have the accounts publically available. 
Therefore the time for the input for each company is not comparable to each other. There will 
not be a comparison between companies based on the results here. Still, since the testing is for 
an intertemporal period, the result will give an indication whether the companies are staying 
with leverage levels within the theoretical optimal boundaries. But the results for each company 
will not be comparable to the next one.  
Further, the model assumes a lognormal calculation of the changes in EBIT, and the standard 
deviation. In reality EBIT may be negative for companies, even over a period of many years. This 
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is also the case for many of the companies in the sample. Hence, calculating the variance and 
standard deviation by log normality is not possible. The numbers are therefore from simple 
return, which will bias the results from the test. Still, the deviation should not be so different 
that the results would not give any meaningful results of where the companies are regarding 
choice of capital structure over the period.  
All input and variables are divided by EBIT each corresponding year. EBIT is therefore 1 in each 
case, and the other variables are their value relative to EBIT. The input in the model is then the 
average of the variables over the period. This gives the intertemporal testing, which rather allow 
saying whether the companies are within the boundaries in the period or not, as an average 
than if there were a year they were not.  
A valuation of the whole company is not necessary to get the results we are looking for. By using 
this approach, we can focus on the measurable variables, and stick to the calculations we may 
observe.  
To see the processed input for each company, see appendix.  
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10. The results from the testing 
Please see appendix for a complete table of results, and companies tested.  The inputs for the 
calculations are available on request.  
Many of the companies in the original sample were missing data points and removed. The US 
tested companies all have 24 observations. For the Norwegian companies the average is 16.6 
observations, with three of them less than 10. One observation represent one year of 
accounting data. Those with less than 10 observations are specified where mentioned, and in 
the table showing the input for the test.  
For companies fully testable, there are three corresponding graphs (See appendix for all of 
them). The model, programmed in Wolfram Mathematica the computer tool, did not allow for 
sufficient iterative calculations to make all critical variables dynamic, the way I modeled it. 
Hence, in the testing either My or C was fixed. I have therefore found the corresponding My to 
the company’s PE ratio, as described, and then I have tested for the optimal coupon with the 
corresponding My and finally checked if that affected My. Optimally this process should have 
been completed repeatedly, converging to the optimal solution.  I was in dialogue with others to 
solve the problem, but the scope of the number of calculations which had to be made for each 
iteration seem to have set a limit to the number of variables possible. A more powerful 
computer, flexible programming or another mathematical program may provide better testing.  
The result we want to find is the level of the coupon relative to EBIT. Then I will present how the 
company has accommodated their capital structure compared to the optimal level I have as 
output.  
The US Companies 
For the tested US companies, all companies which returned a result gave an optimal coupon 
over 1. According to the testing the optimal level of c should be higher than the cash generated 
by the company’s assets, EBIT, in the period. An optimal level of debt giving a higher interest 
cost than what the assets in the company can support is not sustainable over time. For a shorter 
period a coupon higher than EBIT is not a problem, as long as it is lower than the debt service 
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capacity of the company. Depreciation and amortization are non cash costs, which can service 
debt in the short term. In the long run depreciation and amortization costs must be assumed 
real costs, equal to required capital expenditures to stay in business. The debt will in other 
words consume the company in the long run if the coupon is higher than EBIT. Without infusion 
of new funds the company will have no other choice than to default.  To support a higher 
coupon than the companies’ cash flow supports, there has to be growth. I will therefore test for 
the growth rate of the companies to their respective PE average, and use the growth rate as 
input for testing the optimal coupon at restructuring.  
One of the companies which allowed testing of all variables was Chevron, a US fully integrated 
Oil Company.  
 
Figure 3: The X-axis is the growth ratio, while the Y-axis is the PE ratio. To find the relevant growth rate, we use the observed 
PE ratio, and read off the corresponding growth rate. For Chevron the PE ratio is 10.18 which give a growth rate of -0.010 or -
1.0%.  
 
The first test for all companies was to find µ (the growth rate) for the relevant PE ratio (Value of 
the company, here debt plus equity divided by EBIT). Graphed is the output for Chevron that has 
a PE of 10.18, implying a growth rate of -0.01. By all means, a negative growth rate for a major 
oil company seems reasonable, as replacement of oil reserves is the key challenge in the 
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business. Most companies in the business have accepted the peak oil theory
4
, and by that will 
the organic growth be negative.  
By putting the growth rate in, and test for the optimal coupon gave the following result.  
 
Figure 4: Here the X-axis shows the coupon and the corresponding Chevron-value at the Y-axis. As we see the optimal coupon 
is 2.6 times EBIT, meaning that the optimal debt level will be a coupon 2.6 times the cash flow Chevron has to service its debt 
with.  
The X-axis represents the coupon, and the Y-axis gives the PE or corresponding value of the 
company for different debt levels. According to the results, the optimal coupon of Chevron 
should be 2.6, meaning that the optimal coupon is 2.6 higher than Chevron generates in cash. A 
first assumption would be that the coupon should not be higher than 1, but lower if the risk in 
the company is high. Chevron has an EBIT standard deviation of 0.713 which among the tested 
companies is average, or in the lower range. In theory, e.g. as the numerical examples 
presented by LJG the σ is from 0.23 to 0.27 which is substantially lower. The risk in the tested 
companies is therefore higher than the levels used in most theoretical and numerical examples. 
I will discuss this further below, but consequences of this should be in mind while reading the 
following results. A debt level with a coupon more than twice the cash generated to service the 
debt indicate that the equity owners are taking out all future profit right now, and leave the risk 
to the debt-holders. For a negative growth company this might be the optimal solution for the 
equity as well, but it’s not likely that creditors will accept such levels of debt.  
                                                          
4
 Theory presented by M. King Hubbert, that at a certain point the major oil resources in the world will be 
empty, and that there will be a peak in the oil production, which will result in a decline in rate at a certain 
point in time.  
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The company returning the lowest coupon among those available for testing, or were possible 
to test is a US company called Legg Mason. Legg Mason is a US listed global asset management 
company with a σ of 0.38.  
 
Figure 5 - The X-axis is the growth ratio, while the Y-axis is the PE ratio. To find the relevant growth rate, we use the tested PE 
ratio, and read off the corresponding growth rate. For Legg Mason the PE ratio is 10.09 which give a growth rate of -0.012 or -
1.2%.  
The PE ratio implies a growth rate of -0.012. With the credit crunch in 2008 freshly in mind, a 
negative growth rate for an asset management firm is not too unreasonable. By using this 
growth rate as input for the testing, the optimal coupon is 1.05, or 5% larger than the EBIT they 
are generating. With negative growth and a coupon larger than the EBIT, the company will not 
have the best prospects to fulfill its obligations.  
 
Figure 6 - The X-axis shows the coupon and the Y-axis the corresponding Legg Mason-value. As we see the optimal coupon is 
1.05 times EBIT, hence 5% larger than the cash flow to service it.  
  
0.015 0.010 0.005 0.005 0.010 0.015
10
12
14
16
0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4
10.0
10.5
33 
 
The Norwegian Companies 
For the Norwegian companies, none of them returned an optimal point of c. There were also 
many strange results compared to the US tested corporations. Please have in mind the 
difference in tax on interest and capital, as this is one of the differences between the countries. 
Also the cost of bankruptcy is different, 7% in the US versus 1% in Norway. I will touch more 
upon these issues in the conclusion chapter. The growth rate is also tested for the Norwegian 
companies, in the same way as for the US corporations. Please see Appendix for the output.  
Still most companies returned almost optimal coupon levels. Those were in line with the US 
results, that the coupon at each restructuring point optimally was larger than EBIT. As an 
illustration for one of those close to an optimal point is Ekornes, a Norwegian furniture 
manufacturer. With a growth rate of -1% and a PE a bit over 9.2 this was the result: 
 
Figure 7 – The X-axis is the coupon and the Y-axis shows the corresponding PE value for Ekornes. As we may see, the curve 
breaks down right before an optimal max point seems reached. Since the testing is numerical, there will not necessarily be an 
optimal point for a company at all. But a weakness in the model or with the used computer tool might also be the case.  
The curve breaks down right before the optimal level seems reached.  
There does not need to exist an optimal solution for Ekornes or the other Norwegian 
companies, as the solutions are numerical. Since the result from the Norwegian tested 
companies is that none of them returned an optimal solution, the inputs for the Norwegian 
companies are limiting the feasible sample space. For the avoidance of doubt, the model might 
be correct, but with the restrictions the Norwegian input add, a solution does not need to exist. 
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This input is, among others, the tax rate on interest and the effective tax on equity for instance. 
Another difference is the cost of bankruptcy, which is 6 percent points lower in Norway than in 
the US. The lack of an optimal solution is therefore a combination of all these factors. The model 
will have intervals, where no solution is possible, as the input limits the sample space. As an 
example of such “illegal” intervals, could be the optimal solution would be close to or an 
imaginary number5, and by that outside the results allowed here. A solution does not need to 
exist at all either, as the input might restrict the realistic interval to have a solution.  
To illustrate how strange some of the other results were, I also show Statoil (figure 9). Statoil is 
a Norwegian fully integrated oil and gas company, with the government as majority owner. Bear 
in mind that the effective tax rate for oil companies are higher than regular, 78.16%, hence the 
benefit of holding debt increases even more(effective tax on equity less tax on interest). Though 
Statoil operates worldwide, the absolute majority of its operations are at the Norwegian 
continental shelf, at least over the tested period, so the Norwegian tax rate should be 
representative. The tax on interest is the same. With a growth rate of -5.3% to a PE of 4.1 the 
optimal coupon level was more exponential than optimal. The result does not look like a graph 
for optimizing at all. As commented on Chevron, the optimal solution for the equity seems to be 
taking out of all profit, and leave the company to the creditors.  
 
Figure 9 – The graph is the output for Statoil, with the X-axis being the coupon and the Y-axis the corresponding value of the 
company. Compared to TGS all coupon levels are positive here, but the output suggests that the optimal solution is an 
exponential increase in debt.  
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11. Are the companies within the leverage bounds? 
I will here present the findings for the test of the upper and lower bounds. Note that the levels 
are tested with EBIT as reference, and not the value of the companies. Still, those values are 
directly linked, and a function of each other.  The restructuring level, F, is measured with the 
average EBIT the companies had through the sample period. The table below shows the input 
for each company, of those which were testable. Of a list of over 100 companies, only 15 
companies were applicable for the model used, and three of the companies have less than 10 
observations (starred in the left column). Of these companies again, only 6 of the US were 
testable in order to find the optimal coupon at a restructuring point, with reference to previous 
chapter. The number of observations is stated in the right column.  
 
Table 1 – Table shows the data used as input for the empirical testing. All figures are measured over the sample period, with 
number of observations in the right column. I have also included the standard deviation for C and PE, to illustrate how much 
the measure varies over the period. The column to the left indicates with a * if there is less than 10 observations.  
Anyway, what we are really interested in is if the companies have made any choices with 
respect to optimally lever the company over the sample period. To see this we want to observe 
how the level of debt changes when EBIT reaches the restructuring boundary, F, and see if there 
are some trends. If a company really makes managerial choices with respect to optimal leverage 
we should expect a debt-ratio graph with slightly decreasing level, which goes back to the initial 
level every time EBIT reaches F. Hence, what we may get are the levels of the upper and lower 
<10 Name r-post tax Stdev EBIT Alpha IssueCost Teff Ti Average C StdevC "PE" Stdev "PE" Observations
USA Average Stdev Average Stdev
CHEVRON 0,04          0,71            0,07          0,01          0,50          0,35          0,15          0,11          9,03        5,78             24
EXXON MOBIL 0,04          0,38            0,07          0,01          0,50          0,35          0,08          0,05          9,75        4,87             24
SCHLUMBERGER 0,04          0,95            0,07          0,01          0,50          0,35          0,14          0,10          20,70      9,06             24
AT&T 0,04          0,37            0,07          0,01          0,50          0,35          0,21          0,06          9,06        3,13             24
VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS 0,04          0,41            0,07          0,01          0,50          0,35          0,23          0,06          7,70        2,72             24
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES 0,04          0,51            0,07          0,01          0,50          0,35          0,23          0,15          12,52      5,79             24
LEGG MASON 0,04          0,38            0,07          0,01          0,50          0,35          0,30          0,14          7,35        3,66             24
Norway Average Stdev Average Stdev
NORSK HYDRO 0,05          0,77            0,01          0,01          0,48          0,28          0,29          0,26          6,31        4,85             24
ORKLA 0,05          0,52            0,01          0,01          0,48          0,28          0,35          0,18          5,67        2,38             23
* YARA INTERNATIONAL 0,05          0,32            0,01          0,01          0,48          0,28          0,10          0,03          7,97        3,64             7
VEIDEKKE 0,05          0,65            0,01          0,01          0,48          0,28          0,38          0,24          6,00        3,40             21
EKORNES 0,05          0,20            0,01          0,01          0,48          0,28          0,05          0,06          8,50        2,42             15
RIEBER & SON 0,05          0,31            0,01          0,01          0,48          0,28          0,23          0,14          7,00        4,28             24
STATOILHYDRO 0,05          0,53            0,01          0,01          0,78          0,28          0,19          0,21          2,85        0,30             24
* PA RESOURCES (OSL) 0,05          1,08            0,01          0,01          0,48          0,28          0,17          0,14          4,36        2,20             7
TGS-NOPEC GEOPHS. 0,05          0,70            0,01          0,01          0,48          0,28          0,05          0,04          7,32        1,67             12
* DOF 0,05          0,59            0,01          0,01          0,48          0,28          0,56          0,29          4,23        2,18             9
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bound, given that the average EBIT is the initial EBIT. The results are presented in the tables 
below.  
 
 
 
Table 2 – This is the output figures from Wolfram Mathematica, after the input from table 1 has been used as input. The 
relevant output from this table is the value of My, which will be used as growth rate when we test for which coupon to me 
optimal at each restructuring. An interesting observation is that all the companies gave a negative My.  
In table 2 is the output after plotting in the input in table 1. All values are relative to EBIT, 
except µ, which is the growth rate to the corresponding average PE ratio over the sample 
period. It is My we are interested in, since it will be used as input to find the optimal coupon for 
each company in the following test (see output in table 3). An interesting observation is that all 
companies, except Southwest Airlines, had a My below zero. Meaning the implied growth rate 
to the corresponding PE average over the period suggests the companies will have negative 
growth. My initial thoughts to this result were that the credit crunch in 2008 had to be the 
<10 Name
USA μ B F Debt-Low A P
CHEVRON 
-0,0100 0,0223 1,2797 0,0728 10,1755 0,9482
EXXON MOBIL -0,0050 0,0257 1,2740 0,0682 10,7605 0,9354
SCHLUMBERGER 
AT&T 
-0,0050 0,0688 1,2501 0,1555 11,2726 2,1909
VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS
-0,0130 0,0742 1,2408 0,1727 9,7459 2,0882
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES 0,0050 0,0409 1,2750 0,1078 14,4523 1,9868
LEGG MASON
-0,0120 0,1033 1,2294 0,2197 10,0856 2,7238
Norway
NORSK HYDRO 
-0,0330 0,0508 1,2347 0,1491 7,7347 1,4241
ORKLA -0,0300 0,1033 1,2084 0,2424 8,0325 2,3529
* YARA INTERNATIONAL
-0,0120 0,0430 1,2256 0,1096 9,2575 1,2439
VEIDEKKE
-0,0320 0,0833 1,2191 0,2106 8,0214 2,0591
EKORNES 
-0,0100 0,0299 1,2034 0,0659 9,2365 0,7320
RIEBER & SON
-0,0140 0,1017 1,2058 0,2221 9,5229 2,5498
STATOILHYDRO
-0,0530 0,0610 1,1492 0,2651 4,1049 1,2508
* PA RESOURCES (OSL)
-0,0730 0,0256 1,2467 0,0932 4,9203 0,5720
TGS-NOPEC GEOPHS.
* DOF 
-0,0490 0,1578 1,1905 0,3292 6,8776 2,6955
Parameters - for observed period
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reason. But a conclusion is not possible to make, without further test, for instance over a 
different sample period. None of these values are of optimal levels of any kind. Since time zero 
is impossible to find for the empirical study, a change in debt level at each time EBIT crosses the 
upper bound might be the only observable. Even that may be hard to quantify, since a decision 
may take time, and it is not necessarily a capital-structure choice if the debt level is changed.  
 
 
Table 3 – The output for the companies which were testable with the used computer, frame-work and Wolfram 
Mathematica. None of the companies had an optimal debt level with a coupon equal to or less than their EBIT. Since most 
companies in reality have a coupon which the can serve with their cash flow, the results are not in line with decisions taken 
by the management of the firms.  
Table 3 shows the output for the companies returning an optimal coupon, when tested. These 
companies are all US. Not even all the US companies returned a value, as seen.  
To give an indication of how the result may be tested, I have made an illustration with the 
output from Chevron. I would like to stress that this is an illustration only, and with the existing 
data sample it cannot be used for really testing the optimality.   
Name
USA C B F Debt-Low A P
CHEVRON 2,6000 0,2635 1,1887 0,4320 13,5311 6,9490
EXXON MOBIL 1,2000 0,3208 1,1768 0,4829 12,6992 7,2171
SCHLUMBERGER 
AT&T 1,1500 0,3223 1,1765 0,4840 12,6425 7,1983
VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS 1,1000 0,3057 1,1762 0,4735 10,7677 5,9960
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES 2,2000 0,2869 1,1880 0,4486 18,0839 9,6382
LEGG MASON 1,0500 0,3180 1,1735 0,4847 10,8813 6,1887
Parameters - with optimzed C, My not adjusted
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Figure 10 – The X-axis is year of the observations, starting in 1984. The left Y-axis is the level for EBIT (year 1, here 1984 being 
equal to 1), B (the default boundary) and F (the restructuring boundary). The right Y-axis refers to the Debt Ratio, being 
Debt/(Debt+Equity). F and B are here increased by | (the scaling factor), being equal to F. Every time EBIT is equal to or larger 
than F, the level of F and B is increased proportionally to |. This graph does not indicate any connection between the level of 
debt and the suggested optimal time to restructure and issue a greater amount of debt.  
I have used the results from the empirical testing over the sample period to see if there are any 
trends. Since all variables are relative to EBIT, EBIT is 1 in 1984. All values are therefore relative 
to EBIT in 1984, also the development in EBIT. Every time EBIT reaches F, both F and B is 
restructured correspondingly with the relative factor, F. For the avoidance of doubt, at each 
point EBIT is equal to or larger than F an increase in the upper and lower bound is made. If EBIT 
ever goes below B, an event of default should have happened according to the theory. We 
should also be able to see if the company has increased the debt when the F level is reached.  
For Chevron such a change in debt may be seen in year 2000 (figure 10), where EBIT breaks 
through the F bound, and the relative debt level increases. But as a trend it is obvious that the 
relative debt level is being reduced. Over the period we should have seen that the level of debt 
had moved slightly downwards between each restructuring, and then gone back to the initial 
level each time EBIT reached F, and an increased amount of debt was issued (figure 11).Figure 
11 illustrates one possible scenario of how the corresponding debt level could have looked like, 
had the company had an active capital structure policy. All the figures are the same as in figure 
10, except the debt level, which is se to the initial level each time F is reached.  
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Figure 11 – All variables are here identical to figure 10, except for the debt ratio. What I have tried to illustrate is how the 
debt ratio could have looked like, had Chevron actively used the model to make their capital structure decisions. In this 
example, the debt level goes down by a ratio of 5% each year, except the years where the EBIT breaks the F boundary. Then a 
refinancing takes place, and the initial level of debt is restored (here 50% debt).  
  
As this not being the case, I have also looked at Verizon, an US telecom company (figure 12). In 
Verizon the theoretical trend of how a company should optimize are more distinctive. There are 
several times the EBIT is breaking through the F bound with a corresponding increase in the 
debt level. If Verizon actually are optimizing its level of debt is still not possible to say. But over 
the sample period it certainly look more like what to expect from the theory. It seems like the 
relative level of debt goes back to a certain ratio, of close to 0.4 in relation to EBIT breaking 
through the F bound. This should be in line with what to expect, with an active capital structure 
policy among the management.  
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Figure 12 – The X-axis is year of the observations, starting in 1984. The left Y-axis is the level for EBIT (year 1, here 1984 being 
equal to 1), B (the default boundary) and F (the restructuring boundary). The right Y-axis refers to the Debt Ratio, being 
Debt/(Debt+Equity). F and B are here increased by |, being equal to F. Every time EBIT is equal to or larger than F, the level of 
F and B is increased proportionally to |. In contrast to the Chevron (figure 9) some kind of relation might be observed. We 
see that the level of debt goes back to approximately 0.4 on several occasions, and this happens close to observations where 
Verizon’s EBIT crosses the F level. Still, no conclusion may be taken from this, as the test is made over the same period as the 
sample have been collected.  
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12. So what may be taken away from the empirical test? 
What we have seen is that the companies possible to test for an optimal coupon all resulted in 
coupons higher than the cash generated to service the debt. Still, the number of companies 
tested is not large enough to draw a general conclusion.  
What we can assume is that the test made here did not allow the parameter variable, EBIT and 
the relative standard deviation to EBIT, to differing too much from those presented in 
theoretical examples, as Leland’s paper from 1994 or Goldstein et al’s from 2001. The observed 
variables differed a lot from those presented in the articles mentioned. I will present the 
variables I believe could be a key element for the tests to fail.  
Since the solutions to these tests are numerical, and not in closed form solution, there does not 
need to exist a solution. There might be optimal solutions for those that did not return any 
result too, but they might be so extreme that they are outside of the boundaries made to keep 
the results virtually possible, or even outside real numbers (R).  
One of the variables is the standard deviation of EBIT. As mentioned, this has been tested on a 
simple return basis, since EBIT was negative for many of the companies on several occasions. 
This alone will bias the variance to some extent, but should be in line with what is reasonable. 
To only test companies which have a positive EBIT in the sample period could therefore improve 
the quality, if the purpose is to examine the validity of the theories. At least it would eliminate 
some of the doubt of the results which is a consequence of mixing simple and logarithmic 
features.  Still, the standard deviations here are so much larger than those presented in theory, 
that the use of simple return cannot explain the difference in variance alone.  
In Goldstein et al’s paper the standard deviations used in the numerical examples are in the 
range 0.23 to 0.27. The average standard deviation in this test was 0.55 for the testable 
companies. The companies that could not be tested for any optimal level of coupon had higher 
standard deviations than this. Especially did the various standard deviations seem to be the key 
among the US companies whether they were testable or not. Those with a high stdev did not 
give any results, while those with levels in the lower end were testable. None of the Norwegian 
companies was possible to test for optimal coupon, so there has be additional differences for 
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them. Please see the appendix for the input of all companies tested. The average standard 
deviation was 2.8 among the complete US sample over the complete sample period (1984-2008) 
and 7.6 for the Norwegians’. In other words does it seem like the variance in EBIT in reality is a 
lot higher than what’s common to assume in theory.  
For the Norwegian companies there has to be further differences, since none of them gave a 
reasonable result. Among the fixed input applying to all the Norwegian companies that differs 
from the US ones are the default costs and the spread in taxes between tax on interests and tax 
on equity.  
In Norway the default cost is 1% of the estate, while its 7% in the US. This means intuitively that 
debt is less risky in Norway than in the US. If the cost of default is less, then it encourages higher 
ratios of debt. The model will take this into account, and should therefore return higher debt 
ratios when the cost of default is lower. I will not conclude with this is the reason for the 
Norwegian companies not giving any results, but mention it as one of the differences between 
the US and Norwegian companies.  
The difference in taxation is also a fixed difference. In Norway the difference between fixed 
income taxation and equity taxation is 48.16% less 28% is 20.16%. In the US the difference is 
50% less 35% is 15%. The benefit of holding debt is in other words higher in Norway than in the 
US. Both the cost of default and the benefit of holding tax encourage higher debt ratios in 
Norway relative to the US. If this is the reason for the testability I cannot say, but its differences 
in fixed input which differs in the two countries.  
Another reason for so many of the companies failing to be tested may also be the way the 
equations are modeled, or the computer tool used. All tests have been deviated with Wolfram 
Mathematica, a computer tool which should be more powerful than Microsoft’s Excel for 
instance, especially when it comes to testing for numerical solutions.  
So is it possible to conclude whether companies are holding optimal levels of debt, which 
amount they should issue when restructuring, and are the results here realistic and in line with 
observed levels? There cannot be made any conclusion of the optimal debt levels. The amount 
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of debt to issue resulted all in coupons higher than the cash flow to service the coupon, so the 
results are in that respect not realistic either. The optimal coupons according to the test were all 
higher than the coupons which could be observed in reality. To make an empirical test of 
whether companies are optimally levered with respect to cost of default and corresponding tax 
shields, will need further model adjustments most likely, and probably allow for more extreme 
variables than the theory take into account today. Using this approach should therefore not be 
the key element in a capital structure decision. But the theories and dynamics of how external 
parameters as tax and risk affect the value of the company could be of help to the decision 
makers.  
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13. Reflections 
During the study of this paper I was confronted with several issues, which I have taken notes of 
and would like to present. Among them were thoughts I got while testing, and direct issues 
regarding capital structure choices.  
First of all, when testing for capital structures in a quantitative way, the data used has to be 
consistent. It does not necessarily matter how all inputs are calculated, as long as the same 
parameter is calculated in the same way throughout the sample period. This has not been the 
case in this study. To take the Norwegian data sample first. In Norway the accounting principles 
have changed over the period, from Norwegian GAAP in the 80’s to IFRS after the millennium. 
The way the input is calculated is of this reason changed over the time. I can’t say if EBIT is 
calculated in the same way now, as in the 80’s or 90’s, or if Thompson Financials have taken this 
development into account.  
For comparing the results between countries the issue becomes even more piquant. IFRS is not 
practiced consistently all over the world, where it is the prevailing standard, and the US has 
another accounting standard, the US GAAP. Comparing the results to, say, whether companies 
in one country are better in accommodating a capital structure which benefits the owners’ best 
to another country becomes difficult.  
There are also theories which the structured credit models do not take into account. The issues 
regarding asymmetric information is hard to quantify, and hence not taken into account. 
Another issue is equity’s ability to force concessions, like in a chapter 11 process in the US. This 
brings us also to how the different legal systems between countries also will affect the optimal 
debt level. Some countries are of the opinion that creditors should have strong protection, 
while other countries protect the equity holders instead. I will not make any statement of 
what’s best or worst, but enjoy bringing up issues which may be of interest in a more 
comprehensive analysis.  
In this thesis all companies existed at the time the data was collected. To test whether 
companies choose to default when having earnings below the default boundary, defaulted 
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companies must be tested. This test is therefore only a test if companies are making managerial 
restructuring choices and increase the debt, not to test whether the default barrier is followed.  
Another issue which struck me was the knowledge of how exposed the government is to 
company earnings, even without holding any equity in them. This is a political issue, so I will not 
argue whether governments holding equity is good or bad. But for an all equity company, the 
government holds a claim of 48.16% of the value in Norway. By acquiring equity as well, the 
community is further exposed to the risk of each company. On the other side does not the 
government claim allow any voting rights unless they hold equity too.  
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Appendix 
14. The model used for testing 
Below are the equations from Wolfram Mathematica, which has been used for the empirical 
testing. It starts with defining the different inputs, and then they are all put together, so they 
become dependent upon each other.  
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15. The input to the tests 
Below is the complete list of tested companies, and their sample values respectively. An 
interesting observation here is to look at the level of the standard deviation for the companies 
over the sample period. They are in average very high, and for all the US companies the average 
is 2.8 and 7.6 for the Norwegians’. This means that the average standard deviation for the 
companies in the samples is 280% for the US companies and 760% for the Norwegian 
companies. In other words, EBIT is a lot more volatile than the commonly used in academia and 
articles trying to explain capital structure decisions mathematically.  
 
Appendix Table 1 – The figures used for input to the model. This is the processed values from the sample period for the US 
companies. 
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Appendix Table 2 - The figures used for input to the model. This is the processed values from the sample period for the 
Norwegian companies. 
 
16. The output from the tests 
Below is all the output from the empirical testing. I have commented each figure, and added the 
corresponding output for each company possible to test.  
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The US companies 
 
CHEVRON  
 
Appendix figure 1 – The X-axis is the growth rate (My), and the Y-axis is the PE ratio 
 
 
Appendix Figure 2 – The X-axis is the coupon relative to EBIT and the Y-axis the corresponding PE ratio.  
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Appendix Figure 3 - The X-axis is the growth rate (My), and the Y-axis is the PE ratio 
 
 
EXXON MOBIL 
 
Appendix figure 4 – The X-axis is the growth rate (My), and the Y-axis is the PE ratio 
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Appendix Figure 5 – The X-axis is the coupon relative to EBIT and the Y-axis the corresponding PE ratio 
 
 
Appendix figure 6 – The X-axis is the growth rate (My), and the Y-axis is the PE ratio 
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SCHLUMBERGER 
PlotK2 − 1 − Q
∗ .
/. EBITGJLcK0.043689256,0.9549, , 0.07,0.01,0,0.498,0.35,0.14L, \, −0.005,0.005^L 
 
Appendix figure 7 – The X-axis is the growth rate (My), and the Y-axis is the PE ratio. There were no solution outside a interval 
of My being -0.005 and 0.005 for Schlumberger, while PE of Schlumberger was 20.7. A corresponding growth rate to the PE 
could therefore not be found.  
AT&T  
 
Appendix figure 8 – The X-axis is the growth rate (My), and the Y-axis is the PE ratio 
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Appendix Figure 9 – The X-axis is the coupon relative to EBIT and the Y-axis the corresponding PE ratio 
 
 
Appendix figure 10 – The X-axis is the growth rate (My), and the Y-axis is the PE ratio 
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VERIZON COMMUNICATION 
 
Appendix figure 11 – The X-axis is the growth rate (My), and the Y-axis is the PE ratio 
 
 
 
Appendix Figure 12 – The X-axis is the coupon relative to EBIT and the Y-axis the corresponding PE ratio 
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Appendix figure 13 – The X-axis is the growth rate (My), and the Y-axis is the PE ratio 
 
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES 
 
Appendix figure 14 – The X-axis is the growth rate (My), and the Y-axis is the PE ratio 
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Appendix Figure 15 – The X-axis is the coupon relative to EBIT and the Y-axis the corresponding PE ratio 
 
 
Appendix figure 16 – The X-axis is the growth rate (My), and the Y-axis is the PE ratio 
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LEGG MASON 
 
Appendix figure 17 – The X-axis is the growth rate (My), and the Y-axis is the PE ratio 
 
 
Appendix Figure 18 – The X-axis is the coupon relative to EBIT and the Y-axis the corresponding PE ratio 
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Appendix figure 19 – The X-axis is the growth rate (My), and the Y-axis is the PE ratio 
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The Norwegian companies 
NORSK HYDRO 
 
Appendix figure 20 – The X-axis is the growth rate (My), and the Y-axis is the PE ratio 
 
 
 
Appendix Figure 21 – The X-axis is the coupon relative to EBIT and the Y-axis the corresponding PE ratio. There is no optimal 
solution with a C*.  
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Appendix figure 22 – The X-axis is the growth rate (My), and the Y-axis is the PE ratio 
 
 
Appendix Figure 23 – The X-axis is the coupon relative to EBIT and the Y-axis the corresponding PE ratio. There is no optimal 
solution with a C*. 
YARA INTERNATIONAL 
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Appendix figure 24 – The X-axis is the growth rate (My), and the Y-axis is the PE ratio 
 
 
Appendix Figure 25 – The X-axis is the coupon relative to EBIT and the Y-axis the corresponding PE ratio. There is no optimal 
solution with a C*. 
VEIDEKKE 
 
Appendix figure 26 – The X-axis is the growth rate (My), and the Y-axis is the PE ratio 
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Appendix Figure 27 – The X-axis is the coupon relative to EBIT and the Y-axis the corresponding PE ratio. There is no optimal 
solution with a C*. 
EKORNES  
 
Appendix figure 28 – The X-axis is the growth rate (My), and the Y-axis is the PE ratio 
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Appendix Figure 29 – The X-axis is the coupon relative to EBIT and the Y-axis the corresponding PE ratio. There is no optimal 
solution with a C*. 
RIEBER & SON 
 
Appendix figure 30 – The X-axis is the growth rate (My), and the Y-axis is the PE ratio 
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Appendix Figure 31 – The X-axis is the coupon relative to EBIT and the Y-axis the corresponding PE ratio. There is no optimal 
solution with a C*. 
STATOILHYDRO  
 
Appendix figure 32 – The X-axis is the growth rate (My), and the Y-axis is the PE ratio 
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Appendix Figure 33 – The X-axis is the coupon relative to EBIT and the Y-axis the corresponding PE ratio. There is no optimal 
solution with a C*. Please see the result chapter for further comments and discussions.  
PA RESOURCES (OSL) 
 
Appendix figure 34 – The X-axis is the growth rate (My), and the Y-axis is the PE ratio 
 
 
Appendix Figure 35 – The X-axis is the coupon relative to EBIT and the Y-axis the corresponding PE ratio. There is no optimal 
solution with a C* 
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TGS-NOPEC GEOPHS 
 
Appendix figure 36 – The X-axis is the growth rate (My), and the Y-axis is the PE ratio. Please see the result chapter for further 
comments. With a PE of 7.35 a reasonable My was not feasible to resolve.  
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Appendix figure 37 – The X-axis is the growth rate (My), and the Y-axis is the PE ratio 
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Appendix Figure 38 – The X-axis is the coupon relative to EBIT and the Y-axis the corresponding PE ratio. There is no optimal 
solution with a C*. 
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